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AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF TRADE GRAVITY MODEL CRITERIA FOR THE WEST 
AFRICAN MONETARY ZONE (WAMZ) 
 
By 
E. D. Balogun1
Email: edbalogun@yahoo.com
ebalogun@unilag.edu.ng
ABSTRACT 
This study gauged the effects of output co-variability, intra-industry intensity of trade and 
endogenous features of the countries such as common language, border, or colonizer, etc. on 
bilateral trade.   The results confirm that similarities in business cycles influence bilateral trade 
among the countries. While the positive effects of the real GDP variable coefficient estimate 
confirms the assertion in the literature that larger countries exert a greater gravitational pull on 
imports and push to exports (Nigeria accounts for approximately 60 per cent of the GDP, land 
mass and population of the group), the negative sign of the per capita income variable coefficient 
estimate is also consistent with expectation that poorer countries (in per capita terms) tend to 
have lesser trade.   Also, the coefficient estimates of the intra-industry trade intensity variables 
were significant.  While the positive sign of the intra-industry trade in agricultural commodities 
suggest that it can, ceteris paribus, lead to trade creation within the region, the negative sign of 
the agricultural and mineral commodities is reflective of the Krugman’s specialization effects 
arising from the fact that Nigeria is a major exporter of crude oil.   It was inferred that these 
results portends that improvements in per capita incomes of WAMZ countries could invariably 
be associated with greater trade in the absence of trade barriers and if supported with common 
currency. This was confirmed by the significance of the trade dummies included in the model. 
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 1. Introduction 
 The desire to evolve a common currency for the ECOWAS sub region has been in the 
offing since the birth of the regional integration body in 1975.  This was considered expedient 
given the fact that there exist in the sub region one of the oldest monetary union that has a single 
currency (CFA Franc) for the Franco-phone West African Countries known as “L’Union 
Economique et Monetaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA)”2.   This informed the setting up of the 
West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ), the proposed 2nd Monetary Zone for non-UEMOA3, as 
a prelude and “fast-track” approach to ultimate unification and adoption of a common 
ECOWAS currency.    
 The quest for an ECOWAS common currency is further encouraged by the successful 
story of European Monetary Union (EMU) that adopted the Euro as its common currency 
beginning from 1999.   It is the general belief that Europe’s path to monetary union could be 
adopted to expedite the ECOWAS common currency project, as it conforms to the theoretical 
literatures on regional integration sequencing, which progressed from free trade area through 
customs union and common market to monetary union (Balassa, 1964).   This approach requires 
that intending members of a monetary union must meet some defined optimum currency area 
criteria which focus on macroeconomic convergence of intending member countries.    
The policy approach to the realization of WAMZ so far, seems to draw essentially from 
these traditional OCA theories that business cycle synchronization and macroeconomic 
convergence make a currency area an optimal monetary arrangement, other things being equal, 
by reducing the scope for asymmetric policy responses to the disturbances hitting the union-wide 
economy {Bayoumi, (1992); Blanchard, O. (1999); Blanchard and Quah (1989)}.  However, for 
about 5 years, the proponents of WAMZ have experimented with this approach but had failed to 
meet specified convergence criteria.  According to Obaseki (2005), “the inability of the member 
countries to implement policies towards the attainment of the ECOWAS single market objective 
and the WAMZ convergence criteria led to the postponement of the launching of the WAMZ 
                                                 
2The union  is made up of eight countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal 
and Togo and has been in existence first as l’Union Monetaire Ouest Africaine UMOA in 1962 and then UEMOA in 
1994.  
3 It is currently made up of five countries: Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra Leone.  Liberia and Cape 
Verde are expected to join later. 
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monetary union to December 1 2009”.   This view is supported by Ojo (2005) who believes that 
there has to be a change in strategy if the objective of WAMZ is to merge with EUMOA to form 
a West African common currency.   This change should conform to EUMOA’s approach to the 
adoption of common currency which differed significantly from the EU’s approach.  According 
to Cobham and Robson (1993), the UEMOA has no robust historical antecedents like the EU, 
especially of successful intra-regional trade integration, but have had a common currency in 
place for several years.  One is therefore inclined to agree with the self-validating theory of 
Fidrmuc (2001), that the best institutional device to guarantee a credible policy commitment to a 
monetary union is to have a monetary union itself in place.  In other words, a currency area can 
be a self-validating optimal policy regime, even when monetary unification does not foster real 
economic integration and intra-industry trade.  This is evident from the UEMOA’s experience 
that monetary union may nonetheless become optimal ex post, even though the individual 
countries that join it do not meet the optimality criteria ex ante.  This is more in conformity with 
the vast literatures on endogenous optimal currency area which argues that monetary union in 
itself could act as a catalyst of business cycle synchronization {Frankel and Rose (2000); 
Fidrmuc Jarko (2001)}.  
The objective of this paper is to test alternative trade theories especially one rooted in the 
specialization versus endogeneity of optimum currency area (OCA) theory for establishing the 
feasibility of WAMZ.   
2. The Theoretical and Analytical Framework of the Trade Gravity Model 
 The theoretical foundations for the trade gravity model can be found in two classes of 
new alternative trade theories: (a) the Krugman specialization hypothesis model and (b) the 
endogeneity of OCA hypothesis models.  Both theories are rooted in trade geography and 
represent a forward looking analytical framework, unlike earlier theories which investigated the 
suitability of a group of partner countries for monetary integration that are by necessity 
backward looking.  These models argue that monetary integration represents a structural break 
for any group of countries and the single currency will affect all economic and financial areas 
and the policy decision making process.  Consequently, these countries may be confronted with 
at least two distinct paradigms with quite different implications for future economic and 
financial developments in the currency areas and the benefits and costs from sharing a single 
currency.  These paradigm shifts are embodied in  the “Krugman Specialization hypothesis” 
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which postulates that increasing specialization and possible greater exposure to asymmetric 
shocks could follow the adoption of monetary integration; and the “endogeneity of OCA 
hypothesis” that postulates that countries adopting a single currency are more likely to become 
more integrated.  Both hypotheses have strong theoretical underpinnings.  
2.1  The “Krugman Specialization Hypothesis” Test 
 This hypothesis based upon Krugman (1993) and Krugman and Venables (1996)) is 
rooted in trade theory that a single currency will allow for the exploitation of economies of scale, 
and the new literature on economic geography, that postulates a U-shaped relation between 
integration and geographic concentration. In this literature, very high and very low trading costs 
favour dispersion of production.  When trading costs fall and obstacles to trade fade, firms will 
be encouraged to exploit increasing returns by relocating and thereby altering the industrial 
structure.  Krugman (1991a), (1991b), and (1992), Bertola (1993), and Rauch (1994) argue that 
at this stage any external economy leading to increasing return will produce a concentration of 
some industries in any country that enjoys even a small advantage over the others.  To the extent 
that monetary integration might expedite industry concentration and eventually national 
specialization, a “common” shock to a specific sector or industry will asymmetrically affect the 
countries in which that industry is located. Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen and Yosha (2001a) provide 
empirical evidence that private risk sharing enhances specialization in production. More 
integrated, inter-regional and international financial markets allow regions and countries to 
insure against idiosyncratic shocks, permitting them to reap the gains from specialization. “The 
single currency will not affect other trading costs such as differences in conventions, languages, 
and legal systems.   According to Bertola (1993): "at the theoretical level, if increasing returns to 
scale are as important as recent models of endogenous growth suggest, and if they may be 
exploited along geographical dimensions as well as over time, then removal of obstacles to 
factor reallocation may well lead to concentration of production and growth in privileged 
regions.… .Geographic concentration of production and growth may indeed be necessary to 
exploit the scale economies made possible by economic integration".   
 The major criticism of the “Krugman specialization hypothesis” is that it has a bearing on 
the costs from monetary integration. Mongelli notes that if countries become more specialized 
and vulnerable to asymmetric shocks, and output fluctuations start diverging, then each member 
country might feel a higher cost from the loss of the direct control over its nominal exchange rate 
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and national monetary policy.  The intensity and speed with which it displays this effect will 
depend on a variety of factors including, amongst others, the availability of human capital and 
knowledge-related variables, R&D expenditure, product cycles, the share of intra- and inter-
industry trade, the effective mobility of factors of production including labour, as well as 
cultural, linguistic, and other historical barriers.  Specialization could be expedited by the 
implementation of the single market programme and  the cut back of state subsidies and various 
privileges for national enterprises.   
2.2 The “Hypothesis of Endogeneity of OCA” 
 Mongelli (2002) notes that “the intuition behind the hypothesis of endogeneity of OCA is 
that monetary integration reduces trading costs beyond the elimination of the costs from 
exchange rate volatility (that can be to some extent hedged)”.  He maintains that “amongst 
others, it precludes future competitive devaluation, fosters trade and financial integration, 
facilitates foreign direct investment and the building of long-term relationships, and might over 
time encourage forms of political integration”. Taken to an extreme this paradigm suggests that a 
group of countries adopting a single currency might develop into an “optimum currency area” 
ex-post even if they don’t constitute one ex-ante (Rose (2000) and Frankel and Rose (1998, 
2000)). 
 Beginning with a pioneering work, Frankel and Rose (1997) show that a country’s 
suitability for entry into a currency union depends on a number of economic conditions.  These 
include, inter alia, the intensity of trade with other potential members of the currency union, and 
the extent to which domestic business cycles are correlated with those of the other countries, 
conditions that can be said to be endogenous.   Using thirty years of data for twenty 
industrialized countries, they investigated the relationship between the two phenomenons and 
uncovered a strong and striking empirical finding: countries with closer trade links tend to have 
more tightly correlated business cycles. It follows that countries are more likely to satisfy the 
criteria for entry into a currency union after taking steps toward economic integration than 
before. 
   In a follow-up study, Rose (2000) finds a large positive effect of a currency union on 
international trade, and a small negative effect of exchange rate volatility. By using a gravity 
model on a panel covering 186 countries during 1970-1990, Rose finds that countries sharing the 
same currency trade three times as much as they would with different currencies.   Frankel and 
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Rose (2000) extend the framework of Rose (2000) and use a panel covering 200 countries plus 
dependencies. Their main findings are that: currency union more than triples trade among partner 
countries; the ratio of trade to output falls by 0.2 % for every 1 % increase in size (hence, larger 
countries are relatively more self-sufficient); there is no evidence of trade diversion; and every 1 
% increase in trade – to GDP ratio raises income per capita by about 1/3 of a percent over a 20-
year period. Frankel and Rose (2000) explore first the link between currency unification and 
trade and then the link between trade and growth. However the minimum point estimate (from 
Persson) still estimates a 13 per cent increase in trade from currency unification with a preferred 
estimate of around 40 per cent.   
 Fontagné and Freudenberg (1999) emphasize the importance of product differentiation in 
international trade: intra-industry trade can occur in horizontally differentiated goods (two-way 
trade in varieties) as well as in vertically differentiated goods (two-way trade in qualities).  The 
former type of intra-industry trade fosters more diversified economies and symmetric shocks 
(Kenen (1969)), and the endogeneity of OCA paradigm.  Fontagné and Freudenberg (1999) find 
that the elimination of exchange rate variability fosters intra-industry trade and raises its share 
above that of inter-industry trade. Economic size influences productivity allowing larger political 
units to attain higher incomes than smaller ones. In the absence of size, trade permits countries to 
attain economies of scale and higher income levels. An increase in size through economic 
growth leads to diminishing returns and congestion effects. Public goods can instead be more 
efficiently supplied by smaller political units.  
 Alesina, Barro and Tenreyro (2002) noted that as the number of independent countries 
increases and their economies become more integrated, we would expect to observe more multi-
country currency unions.  They examined the pros and cons for different countries to adopt as an 
anchor the dollar, the euro, or the yen, and concluded that while there appear to be reasonably 
well-defined euro and dollar areas, there does not seem to be a yen area. Drawing largely from 
the endogeneity hypothesis criteria, they address the question of how trade and co-movements of 
outputs and prices would respond to the formation of a currency union. They adjudged this 
response to be important because the decision of a country to join a union would depend on how 
the union affects trade and co-movements. 
 Fidrmuc (2001) tested the endogeneity hypothesis of OCA criteria on a cross-section of 
OECD countries between 1990 and 1999.  The findings indicate that convergence of business 
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cycles relates to intra-industry trade, but has no direct relation between business cycles and 
bilateral trade intensity.  He concludes that as far as intra-industry trade is positively correlated 
with trade intensities, the result confirms the OCA endogenity hypothesis.  He concludes that the 
endogenity of OCA linkage criteria implies extensive business cycle harmonization between the 
CEECs and EU countries in the medium term.  
 What effect could monetary integration have on relative prices and hence real exchange 
rates? Beck and Weber (2001) use consumer price data for 81 European cities (in Germany, 
Austria, Switzerland, Italy, Spain and Portugal) to study the effects of German and European 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) on both intra-national and international relative price 
volatility.  They find that the elimination of nominal exchange rate volatility during EMU has 
largely reduced cross-borders real exchange rate volatility (by roughly 80 percent). However, 
distance and national borders still have a positive and significant impact on relative price 
volatility even in EMU.  
 Corsetti and Pesenti (2002) argued that a currency area can be a self-validating optimal 
policy regime, even when monetary unification does not foster real economic integration and 
intra-industry trade.  In their model, they argue that firms choose the optimal degree of exchange 
rate pass-through to export prices while accounting for expected monetary policies, and 
monetary authorities choose optimal policy rules while taking firms’ pass-through as given.  
They show that two equilibriums exist, each of which defines a self-validating currency regime.  
One of the options available and consistent with OCA, they maintained, would be for the firms 
to preset prices in consumer currency, and a monetary union would be an optimal policy choice 
for all countries as a common currency would help to synchronize business cycles across them.  
 Anyanwu (2003) in a study titled “Does monetary union affect trade and output” 
examined the various theories and paradigms relating to trade and output in monetary union.  
Applying the endogeneity gravity models similar to Frankel and Rose (2000) and Alesina, Baro 
and Tenreyro (2000), he estimated the effects of monetary union on bilateral trade and output.  
His results show that WAEMU countries with the same currency trade about twice as much with 
each other as countries with different currencies within ECOWAS.  The results also show that 
monetary union among WAEMU countries leads to a ten-fold increase in their output, which 
otherwise would have been lost without monetary union.  He concludes that the test of 
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endogeneity of OCA criteria hypothesis that important beneficial effects follow ex post a 
monetary union through the promotion of trade and central bank credibility is confirmed.  
 Three main observations emerged within the literature with regard to the endogenenity of 
OCA criteria: first, Frankel and Rose, as well as several other authors, including Rodrik (1994), 
Helpman (1988) and Bradford and Chekwin (1993) raise the issue of simultaneity between trade 
and growth, and argue that causality may run from investment to growth and then to exports, 
rather than the other way around.  Secondly, Mongelli (2002) noted that EMU has the character 
of a collective Endeavour both from an institutional and economic standpoint. It would be 
interesting to see this hypothesis tested in a more detailed model. Furthermore, the trade-channel 
should be operating in addition to other channels such as the nominal anchor effect (i.e. 
monetary discipline).  Thirdly, relevant question at present in Europe is whether countries are in 
a currency union because they trade a lot, or start trading more because they are in a currency 
union.  The same has happened for inflation in countries with a poor track record in maintaining 
low inflation after “anchoring” themselves to low inflation countries.   Issing (2001) discusses 
the endogeneity of political integration, and Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) discuss the 
endogeneity of labour market institutions.  
3. The Model of Endogeneity of OCA Criteria 
The analytical model estimated in this section is rooted in the trade gravity models as 
propounded by Frankel and Rose (1997), Rose (2000) and Masson and Pattillo (2004). These 
authors maintained that a typical gravity model is usually specified to include as explanatory 
variables the product of the two countries’ real GDP, both in levels and per capita, the distance 
between them, and the land areas of the two countries. In addition, a number of dummy variables 
are included to capture the possible effects of common features of the countries: membership in 
a free trade area or currency union, a common language, border, or colonizer, etc. The gravity 
equation is typically specified in logarithms, so that:  
)1.()ln()ln()ln()ln(
1
33210 EqDAreaAreaPop
Y
Pop
YYYX k
n
k
kji
j
j
i
i
jiij L∑
=
+++++= βββββ  
Whereby Xij is the bilateral trade between the two countries, Y is the real output, Pop is the 
population, Area denotes the land mass, D the various dummy variables.   This specification is 
consistent with Rose (2000) and a number of others.  It was also observed that the other variant 
of the endogeneity of OCA model as estimated by Frankel and Rose (1997) can be rendered as: 
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 ( ) ( ) )2.(log, EqYYBTIQQCorr jiTijji LLL−+++= θλβα  
This was however modified by Fidrmuc (2001) to include intra-industry trade intensity as one of 
the explanatory variables as follows: 
 ( ) ( ) )3.(log, EqYYBIITTIQQCorr jiijTijji LLL−++++= θλγβα  
Whereby:  
 Bilateral Trade Intensity is defined as: 
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Whereby Co-mov(Qi,Qj) stands for the co-movement of real gross domestic product , Q of 
country i and j.;  denotes the natural logarithm of bilateral trade intensity between country i 
and j defined in relation to export, import or total trade;  is a measure of intra-industry trade 
intensity; B is defined as the log of distance between a country or region and the nearest 
member; Y denotes the national incomes of the countries.   
T
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Abstracting from the above models the explicit form of the trade gravity model that is 
estimated in this section can be rendered as:  
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And , , BTEEijBETI
ME
ijBMETI i and BTEj BTMEi and BTMEj TTMEi and TTMEj denotes the 
bilateral export and total trade; YRi and YRj are the real GDP of  countries i and j.  is the 
ratio of the agricultural (intra-industry) trade intensity of  both countries;  is the ratio of 
the agricultural and mining (intra-industry) trade intensity of  both countries; D
AG
ijIIT
AGMI
ijIIT
1 is a dummy for 
adjacency or common border; D2 is a dummy for common language; D3 is a dummy for common 
currency and D4 is a dummy for common colonial ties 
Using pooled equation regression models, equations 5 and 6 are estimated for the WAMZ 
countries.  In general, we adopted the 5 x 2 cross sectional panel data to capture the entire 
bilateral relationships similar to what was done in the previous chapter.  These bilateral 
relationships (cross sections of the panel) are: Gambia-Ghana, Gambia-Guinea, Gambia-Nigeria, 
Gambia-Sierra Leone, Ghana-Guinea, Ghana-Nigeria, Ghana-Sierra Leone, Guinea-Nigeria, 
Guinea-Sierra Leone and Nigeria-Sierra Leone.  
4. Regression Results of the Trade Gravity Models 
The regression result of the trade gravity models specified in Equations 5 and 6 are as 
shown in Table 1.   Equation 1a represents the regression results for the bilateral export trade 
dependent variable, while that of 1b is for the total bilateral trade dependent variable.  The 
independent variables can be grouped into economic or quantitative variables presumed to be the 
determinants of endogeneity and qualitative variables captured by the dummies.  The equations 
were estimated using seemingly unrelated regression models from a quarterly sample 1996:1 to 
2004:4 amounting to 36 numbers of observations for 10 cross-sections making a balanced panel 
of 360.The log linear regression models were estimated and the results are summarized into a 
table for analytical convenience.  A review of the estimated equations shows that their goodness 
of fit is high with adjusted R2 as high as 85% for both equations.  It is worthy to mention that 
three groups of  the relationship of interest in this regression analysis are: (i) the effect of output 
covariability on trade intensity (which is proxied by the log of the product of the bilateral real as 
well as per capita GDP of the two countries; (ii) the effect of intra-industry trade on bilateral 
trade intensity (which is captured in this model by the agricultural and primary commodities 
intra-industry trade); and (iii) the effects of common features of the countries such as 
membership in a free trade area or currency union, a common language, border, or colonizer, etc. 
on bilateral trade.   
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Bilateral Trade and Real and Per Capita GDP Relatives 
 As indicated in the theoretical framework, the OCA theory suggests that if there are 
similarities in the co-variation or correlation of outputs, it is expected to be positively related to 
the bilateral trade intensity between the two countries.  Two measures of output correlations in 
our model are: (a) log of the product of Real GDP of country i and j in the bilateral trade 
relations denoted by  and (b) the log of the product of their per capita income 
respectively which is denoted as: 
)( RjRi YYLOG ∗
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ∗
j
Nj
i
Ni
Pop
Y
Pop
YLOG  .  This specification is consistent with 
Rose (2000).  These coefficients are significant especially that of the intra-WAMZ total trade 
model.  However, while the sign of the log of the product of real GDP variable is positive, 
confirming that similarities in business cycles have positive effects on bilateral trade among the 
countries, the coefficients of the product of the per capita GDP is negative.   This is 
consistent with the 
results of similar gravity 
models tests by Masson 
and Pattillo (2004) 
which seems to capture 
well the determinants of 
bilateral trade between 
countries.  The positive 
sign of the real GDP 
variable coefficient 
estimate agrees with 
their findings that larger 
countries exert a greater 
gravitational pull on 
imports and push to 
exports.  This is most likely to be true with respect to trade flows intra-WAMZ given the fact 
that Nigeria accounts for approximately 60 per cent of the GDP, land mass and population of the 
group.  Her pull on imports is very dominant especially so given her buoyant foreign exchange 
LOG
L
_
_
_
R
A
    S
    S
E
Dep. Variable
Indepent Variable Coef. t-Stat. Prob. Coef. t-Stat. Prob.
LOG(YRI*YRJ) 0.172 3.8 0.00 0.632 19.1 0.00
{(Yi/Popi)*(Yj/Popj)} -0.370 -8.3 0.00 0.082 4.2 0.00
OG(IITAGi/IITAGj) 0.064 4.1 0.00 -0.007 -3.6 0.00
LOG(IITAGMII/IITAGMIj) -0.635 -11.4 0.00 0.019 4.8 0.00
Fixed Effects
_GAMGHA--C 1.940 0.203
_GAMGUI--C 0.573 -1.123
GAMNIG--C 0.779 1.985
_GAMSLN--C -0.115 -1.713
_GHAGUI--C 0.787 0.202
_GHANIG--C 7.578 2.151
_GHASLN--C -0.661 0.266
_GUINIG--C 4.098 1.853
GUISLN--C 1.705 -1.071
NIGSLN--C 2.230 1.978
-squared 0.856 0.978
djusted R-squared 0.851 0.977
S.E. of regression 0.980 0.203
Durbin-Watson stat 0.274 0.371
Log Likelihood 502.2
    Mean dependent var -0.51 7.479
.D. dependent var 2.534 1.351
um squared resid 316.8 14.31
stimated using Seemingly unrelated regression methods
Table 1: Regression Results of Intra-WAMZ Trade Gravity Models 
 a. BILAT. EXPORTS  b. BILAT. TOT. TRADE
LOG(BTEIJ) LOG(TTMEIJ)
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reserves derived from exports of crude oil.  She also seems to serve as a base for re-exports of 
food and other consumer products via informal trade within the ECOWAS sub region.   
The negative sign of the coefficient of the per capita GDP variable is also consistent with 
Masson and Pattillo’s (2003) findings that richer countries (in per capita terms) also tend to have 
higher trade and by implication poorer countries tend to have lesser trade.  This is largely true 
since a priori information on per capita incomes of the countries indicated that they are all 
classified among low income and somewhat below the poverty lines.  One is therefore not 
surprise that the sign of the coefficient of this variable is negative. The result can therefore be 
said to be salutary as it portends that improvements in per capital incomes of WAMZ countries 
could invariably be associated with greater trade in the absence of trade barriers and if supported 
with common currency.    
This assertion is consistent with the per capita income ex post convergence theorists who 
maintains that regional integration especially the one advanced by creating a monetary union, 
may lead to convergence of income levels by stimulating growth in the poorer countries through 
increased trade (Masson and Pattillo (2004)).  They further argue that related initiatives to 
liberalize factor movements would also favor growth of poorer countries by allowing capital and 
labor to move to the locations where they are most productive.   In general, this is consistent with 
the assertion by Jenkins and Thomas (1996) that “there is a growing consensus that ‘convergence 
clubs’ exist, where countries with a lower GNP per capita grow more rapidly because they are 
members of a trade group, or because domestic policy gains credibility by being tied to the 
domestic policy of a country with a better economic reputation”.  Although for now, there are 
doubts with regard to fiscal credibility of the intending members of WAMZ, especially Nigeria, 
she can certainly gain from allowing her domestic monetary and exchange rate policy to be tied 
to a regional convergence benchmark if for no other reason but fiscal discipline effects.    
Bilateral Trade and Intra-Industry Trade Intensity  
You would recall that from the point of view of endogeneity of OCA theory, if intra-
industry trade accounts for a high share in trade, then, ceteris paribus, business cycles are 
expected to become more similar across countries.  By contrast, increased bilateral trade 
intensity may lead to divergence of business cycles if the increase in trade is due mainly to 
increased specialization as predicted by the alternative OCA view (the Krugman’s specialization 
theory).   In order to reflect both theories in our model, I included as explanatory variables and 
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determinants of bilateral trade two variants of intra-industry trade variables: the first is defined as 
the log of the ratio of intra-industry trade in agriculture of both countries, ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
AG
j
AG
i
IIT
IITLOG , 
designed to capture endogeneity of OCA theory, as a priori information suggests very strong 
similarities in structure of agricultural trade.  The second is defined as the log of the ratio of 
intra-industry trade in primary commodities (agriculture and mineral resources), 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
AGMI
j
AGMI
i
IIT
IITLOG , designed to capture Krugman’s specialization theory effects, given the sharp 
differences in this variable between Nigeria and the rest members of WAMZ.  This stems from 
the fact that Nigeria is a major exporter of crude oil and a member of OPEC, a marketing cartel 
that was able over time to guarantee better terms of trade for her members, as against the 
deteriorating terms of trade faced by the other WAMZ members with regard to exports of solid 
minerals.   
 From the Table 1, it can be seen that the coefficient estimates of both variables are 
significant suggesting that intra-industry trade intensity have significant effects on bilateral trade.  
However, while the sign of the parameter estimate of intra-industry trade in agricultural 
commodities is positive, that of bilateral primary commodities trade intensity is negative.   
 The positive sign of the agricultural trade intensity variables suggest that the positive 
bilateral co-movements can, ceteris paribus, lead to trade creation within the region.  This is 
plausible, given the structure of agricultural trade within the region, which are mostly in staple 
foods especially grains, tubers, vegetable oils and livestock products (live animals, poultry and 
eggs).  Sufficient pockets of deficit in supply of these products exist within the region, especially 
in Nigeria, sufficient to pull imports towards her.  This fact is evidenced by the large food 
imports of these countries from the rest of the world which accounts for a significant proportion 
of their foreign exchange spending annually. Also, there are strong similarities in agricultural 
export baskets to the rest of the world, made up of cocoa, coffee, palm produce, groundnut and 
ginger, and they indeed face the same terms of trade.  This similarity is therefore supportive of 
the fact that opportunities exist to negotiate for better terms of trade as a regional group or trade 
bloc, an action that could lead to ex post convergence of business cycles and ultimately trade 
creation within the sub region.    
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 The negative sign of the parameter estimate of the coefficient of the intra-industry trade 
in primary commodities is to be expected given the divergence in the structure of commodities 
trade basket.  While oil exports account for about 95 percent of Nigeria’s primary commodity 
exports, the other member countries of WAMZ relied entirely on agricultural and solid mineral 
exports.  Thus, increased dominance of a specialized product like petroleum in the export basket 
of Nigeria portends the fact that opportunities exist for trade expansion in the face of other 
endogenous factors such as proximity, adjacency and common currency.  While Nigeria’s 
exports of petroleum products to the other WAMZ member countries is expected to increase, a 
reciprocal increase in agricultural exports of these countries to Nigeria may also take place.  
Thus, in the event of the emergence of a monetary union, opportunities exist to internalize ex 
post a greater fraction of the region’s trade, given this significant and indeed negative divergence 
of these variables between Nigeria and the rest others.   
Bilateral Trade and Qualitative Trade Gravity Indicators  
 You would recall that the third interest of the estimated gravity model is to measure the 
effects of common features of the countries such as membership in a free trade area or currency 
union, a common language, border, or colonizer, etc. on bilateral trade.  Consequent on this, four 
dummy variables were included in the regression analysis, viz.: adjacency, , 
common language, , common currency, , and common colonizer. 
.   
ADJDLOG )( 1
lANGDLOG )( 2 CURDLOG )( 3
COLDLOG )( 4
Dep. Variable
Indepent Variable Coef. t-Stat. Prob. Coef. t-Stat. Prob.
C -10.036 -7.9 0.00 -4.702 -14.3 0.00
LOG((GDPI?)*(GDPJ?)) -0.262 -2.3 0.02 0.363 12.2 0.00
LOG((NGDPI?/POPI?)*(NG 1.112 11.4 0.00 0.878 31.8 0.00
LOG(XAGI?/XAGJ?) 0.238 15.4 0.00 0.00012 0.1 0.96
LOG(XAGMII?/XAGMIJ?) -0.819 -14.9 0.00 -0.122 -14.3 0.00
DCUR? -3.329 -6.9 0.00 -2.746 -34.4 0.00
LOG(DADJ?) 0.184 0.9 0.37 0.095 3.3 0.00
DCOL? -1.100 -8.0 0.00 -0.481 -13.7 0.00
R-squared 0.376 0.752
Adjusted R-squared 0.362 0.747
S.E. of regression 2.153 0.680
Durbin-Watson stat 0.080 0.032
Log likelihood 206.7
    Mean dependent var -1.44 7.479
    S.D. dependent var 2.696 1.351
    Sum squared resid 1502 162.5
Estimated using Seemingly unrelated regression methods
Table 2: Regression Results of Intra-WAMZ Trade Gravity Models 
 a. BILAT. EXPORTS  b. BILAT. TOT. TRADE
LOG(BTEIJ) LOG(TTMEIJ)  The regression 
result is as shown in table 
2.  In general, the 
coefficient estimates of 
these dummies were 
significant for the bilateral 
total trade but not 
significant for the bilateral 
export trade functions.   
This result shows that 
intra-WAMZ total trade 
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was significantly influenced by these variables.  While adjacency had positive effects, 
differences in currency and language had significant negative effects.  These tended to confirm 
the Rose effects of currency union dummies on trade expansion and/or contraction for the 
WAMZ.  A widely cited recent paper (Rose, 2000), using a global sample, finds that currency 
unions increase trade by about a factor of 3 from cross-sectional results while time-series 
analysis with fixed effects give somewhat lower estimates of around 1.7 (Glike and Rose, 2002). 
Although a simulation to estimate the effects of trade gravity models on the extent of trade 
creation would be conducted, it is most likely that the outcome will compare favorably with 
these results.  This would be subject to particularities which Masson and Pattillo (2004) pointed 
out.   In particular, they note that “while it is useful to have the widest sample possible if that 
sample is homogeneous, it may also be the case that there are particularities in a region that 
make it not comparable to others”.  Perhaps the non-significance of these dummies with regard 
to the bilateral trade coefficients could be attributed to these “particularities” such as lack of 
common borders and common currency, while the dummies for common language and common 
colonizer are not strikingly distinguishing enough to make a difference.   Lack of common 
border becomes much more important, in the face of weak transportation links within the 
ECOWAS sub region and between many African countries.  The Rose effect could also have 
been compromised by poor data on regional trade, as there seems to be a consensus among 
policy analysts that an appreciable unrecorded trade takes place within the sub region.  
5. Summary of Findings and Conclusions 
This model tested the hypothesis that there are significant ex ante similarities in business 
cycles induced by intense bilateral trade and other elements of its “gravity” sufficient enough to 
make the intending members of WAMZ an optimum currency area ex post.  Using econometrics 
methods, the study gauged the effects of output co-variability, intra-industry intensity of trade 
and endogenous features of the countries such as common language, border, or colonizer, etc. on 
bilateral trade.   The results show that: 
a) The coefficients of the log of the product of the GDP and the per capita incomes were 
significant, confirming that similarities in business cycles influence bilateral trade among 
the countries.  However, the positive sign of the real GDP variable coefficient estimate 
confirms the assertion in the literature that larger countries exert a greater gravitational 
pull on imports and push to exports, since Nigeria accounts for approximately 60 per cent 
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of the GDP, land mass and population of the group.  The negative sign of the per capita 
income variable coefficient estimate is also consistent with expectation that richer 
countries (in per capita terms) tend to have higher trade and by implication poorer 
countries tend to have lesser trade.   
b) The coefficient estimates of the intra-industry trade intensity variables were significant.  
While the positive sign of the intra-industry trade in agricultural commodities suggest 
that it can, ceteris paribus, lead to trade creation within the region, the negative sign of 
the agricultural and mineral commodities is reflective of the Krugman’s specialization 
effects arising from the fact that Nigeria is a major exporter of crude oil.  
c)  While adjacency had positive effects, differences in currency and language had 
significant negative effects.  These tended to confirm the Rose effects of currency union 
dummies on trade expansion and/or contraction for the WAMZ. 
In concluding the study inferred that the maintenance of independent flexible exchange 
rate policy by either party to the bilateral trade makes no difference in terms of export 
performance, and may indeed constitute an impediment to free trade within the WAMZ region. 
Among the impediments identified are the microeconomic costs of foreign exchange conversion 
and high incident of trade diversion associated with it. 
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